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Abstract 
After the tremendous accidents in European road tunnels over the past decade, many 
safety assessment methods have been proposed worldwide, most of them based on 
Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA). However, QRAs based on causal chains and 
event modeling (i.e. fault and event trees), have been subject to strong criticism for 
their limitations to capture the overall risk picture of complex socio-technical systems. 
In such systems, human and organizational factors, software errors, design flaws and 
the safety culture of the system are not efficiently handled by the current QRA 
methods and systemic accident models have been proposed as an alternative approach 
to better understand and manage safety. The aim of this work is to overview the 
limitations of current QRAs in the road tunnels field, and to introduce a STAMP-
based technique as an alternative method for establishing a proactive safety strategy 
and evaluating the overall safety of these critical infrastructures, with the objective to 
overcome the QRAs limitations. The STAMP method is applied to a case study 
analysis in the safety critical process of tunnel ventilation during an emergency. 
 
Keywords: Road Tunnel; Safety; Risk Assessment; STAMP; Quantitative Risk 
Assessment 
1 Introduction 
Over the last two decades there has been a great increase in the number of road 
tunnels worldwide and all the indications are that this number will continue to 
increase in the coming years, since the improvement of tunnel construction 
technology has rendered tunnels as a cost-effective solution to connect steep 
mountainous regions and traverse urban areas (Zhuang et al, 2009).  However, the 
increasing number of these infrastructures is a double-edged sword also raising 
upfront an endogenous problem, which is the severity of accidents that may occur. 
Even if accident rates appear to be slightly lower in tunnels than on open road, an 
accident in a tunnel may have much greater impact (Beard and Cope, 2008). The 
consequences can be extremely destructive and dangerous, especially in the event of 
fire, since the enclosed space hinders the dissipation of smoke and poses difficulty in 
ensuring safe escape route of the tunnel users. Furthermore, except for human losses 
and injuries, accidents in road tunnels can also result in considerable financial losses 
and prejudicial consequences for the tunnel manager. As a result, tunnel safety is now 
considered as being one of the key elements in tunnel design, development and 
operation. 
 
Indeed, it was the spate of tunnel fires in Europe over the past decade, resulting in 
many human and financial losses that highlighted safety in road tunnels as a matter of 
utmost importance. Accidents in Mont Blanc (1999), Tauren (1999) and St.Gottard 
(2001) resulted in 58 fatalities over a period of just two years, and forced the 
European Commission to embark upon a major review of road tunnel safety (Beard 
and Cope, 2008). In this context, the European Commission launched the Directive 
2004/54/EC that sets minimum safety requirements and suggests, apart from the 
measures imposed based on parameters such as the tunnel length and the traffic 
volume, the implementation of a safety risk assessment in several cases. This is a 
remarkable aspect about this Directive because it combines both a “guideline-
oriented” and a “risk-oriented” approach. However, the EU Directive (2004) does not 
indicate neither the method for performing the safety risk assessment nor the criteria 
for risk acceptance. Consequently, a wide range of methods have been proposed and 
applied, most of them based on Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA; Piarc, 2008a).    
 
Although QRA contribution to manage safety has been indisputably great in many 
fields, such as the nuclear power industry (where it is called Probabilistic Risk 
Assessment-PRA), QRAs based on causal chains and event modeling (i.e. fault and 
event trees), have been subject to strong criticism for their limitations to capture the 
overall risk picture of complex socio-technical systems (Rasmussen, 1997; Hollnagel, 
2004; Leveson, 2004). In such systems, even proponents of QRAs argue that human 
and organizational factors, software errors, design flaws and the safety culture of the 
system are not efficiently handled by the currently existing QRA methods 
(Apostolakis, 2004; Bier, 1999). Taking into account that road tunnels are not merely 
technical, engineering systems but also have intrinsic organizational, social and 
managerial dimensions that impact or contribute to their safety (Piarc, 2007), it is 
open to question whether QRA, with the aforementioned limitations, is the 
appropriate tool to investigate potential risks and evaluate the overall safety level of 
these infrastructures. Khoury (2005) makes his point clear: “Current road tunnel 
safety is seriously limited by the traditional approach to risk assessment”.  
Furthermore, Beard (2010) stresses the need for a more “systemic” safety risk 
assessment method in the road tunnels field and particularly writes: “Fatality, injury 
and harm result from the working of the whole tunnel system. Safety risk assessment, 
therefore, needs to be as ‘systemic’ as possible. The question is how do we do this?”.  
 
In other hazardous socio-technical systems in society, systems-theoretical 
assumptions are considered a promising way to better understand and manage safety 
(Larsson et al., 2009). In aerospace, aviation, process industry and maritime, systemic 
accident models that view accidents as emergent phenomena arising due to the 
complex interactions among components of the whole socio-technical system are 
currently used for the safety assessment process (Hollnagel, 2004). In this perspective, 
safety is viewed as a control problem (i.e. inadequacy to enforce safety constraints) 
and accidents are regarded to occur when component failures, external disturbances 
and dysfunctional interactions among system components are not adequately handled 
by the safety control system (Leveson, 2004). Two notable systemic accident models 
that have been proposed are Rasmussen’s (1997) hierarchical socio-technical 
framework and Leveson’s (2004) Systems-Theoretic Accident Model and Processes 
(STAMP).  
 
This article’s objective is twofold. The first objective is to examine whether the QRA 
modeling is indeed the best suited method to perform safety assessment of road 
tunnels. Nevertheless, to manage risk it is necessary to understand how accidents 
happen and in order to do this the use of an appropriate model of accident causation is 
critical. Having reviewed the inadequacy of the sequential accident models of QRAs, 
the second objective is to propose an alternative approach based on a different 
foundation. Thus, in this paper we introduce and present the utilization of the STAMP 
accident model as an alternative approach for the safety assessment process of these 
infrastructures. The use of the STAMP model for safety risk assessment in road 
tunnels is an innovative concept of this work. The STAMP-based road tunnel safety 
risk assessment method characteristics and advantages are thoroughly presented 
through a case study. 
 
The remainder of this work is organized as follows. In Section 2 the concept of QRA 
is briefly presented and the limitations of this method in the road tunnels field are 
reviewed. In section 3 the need for a new approach based on systems theory is 
pinpointed. Section 4 introduces the STAMP model in the road tunnels field as an 
alternative approach. To demonstrate the STAMP-based road tunnel safety risk 
assessment method, an illustrative example of a STAMP analysis in the safety critical 
process of tunnel ventilation during an emergency is provided. In Section 5 the 
proposed method is discussed and its limitations are analyzed. Finally, Section 6 
presents the concluding remarks of this work.          
 
2. Reviewing limitations of QRA in road tunnels 
 
2.1. The concept of QRA in the road tunnel field 
  
QRA methods have been adapted to the road tunnels field in order to cope with the 
limitations of prescriptive standards and regulations that traditionally and globally 
have controlled the safety issue (Beard and Cope, 2008; Dix, 2004; Piarc, 2008a). 
Such regulations and standards, even if they manage to ensure a minimum level of 
safety, they are implemented more or less without taking into account the individual 
characteristics of a tunnel, or the interactions among different parts of the tunnel 
system such as the infrastructure, technical systems and operational procedures (Piarc, 
2008a).  As a result, a risk-based safety assessment approach is also needed so as to 
provide a structured and transparent assessment of risks for each particular tunnel. In 
this perspective, the concept of tunnel’s QRA methods is to calculate and evaluate the 
risk level of a road tunnel and then determine whether the desired safety level has 
been accomplished.  
 
The risk is defined by two aspects: the occurrence probability of an event and the 
consequences of that particular event. The Quantitative Risk Assessment is based on 
an inventory of all possible accident scenarios. Event and fault trees are employed to 
identify sequences of events that start with a set of disturbances to the normal 
operation (i.e. initiating events) and end at a set of undesirable end states (Piarc, 
2008a). The fault or event trees that are used to represent the accident causation may 
vary among the different existing methods, but the underlying event-based accident 
model is always the same. The overall risk level of a tunnel is estimated and presented 
in the dimension of the consequences (e.g. the number of fatalities or/and injuries) 
when both the probability and the consequences are assigned to every branch of the 
event or fault tree, as the sum of all probabilities times their consequences.  
 
In order to evaluate the risk level two criteria are mainly used. The first criterion is the 
personal level of risk which is expressed by the individual risk indicator (fatality rate 
per tunnel kilometer). However, even if the individual risk is acceptable, the 
aggregated level of risk on a local or national scale could still be considered 
unacceptable, therefore a societal risk criterion is needed. The societal risk is the risk 
to society ‘as a whole’. A common way to describe societal risk is the expected value 
(number of fatalities per year) and the F/N curves that illustrate the relationship 
between accident frequency and accident severity. Both indices are based on the As 
Low As Reasonably Practicably (ALARP) principle. If the risk index generated by the 
QRA is below a predefined safety target, the road tunnel is regarded as safe. 
Otherwise, risk reduction measures such as traffic volume control, need to be 
implemented (Beard and Cope, 2008).  
 
An extended literature review of the QRA methods applied in the road tunnels field 
can be found in Piarc (2008a). The models that are presented in this report are the 
Austrian tunnel risk model TuRisMo, the Dutch TUNPRIM model, the French 
specific hazard investigation, the Italian risk analysis model for road tunnels and the 
OECD/PIARC DG-QRA model which is the most widely used decision aiding tool 
for the transportation of hazardous materials through a road tunnel. A detailed risk 
assessment with the OECD/PIARC DG-QRA method can also be found in 
Kirytopoulos et al.  (2010a; 2010bq). Other QRA methods for road tunnels have also 
been proposed (Holicky, 2009; Nývlt et al, 2011; Weger et al, 2001; Xiaobo et al., 
2011). All the aforementioned QRA methods not only consider different accident 
scenarios, but are also developed for different types of routes and tunnels (i.e. 
unidirectional or bidirectional tunnels, longitudinally or transverse ventilated tunnels, 
etc.). The considerable number of parameters used in the QRA model also differs. 
However, the key input parameters required in general by QRA models may 
commonly include traffic parameters, tunnel user characteristics, tunnel 
geometrical/geophysical characteristics and tunnel electrical/mechanical systems. 
Traffic parameters may include traffic volume, accident frequencies and traffic 
vehicle composition. Tunnel user characteristics usually refer to the reaction time of 
tunnel users, movement speeds, etc. Tunnel characteristics relate to distance between 
emergency exits, number of lanes, tunnel height and various safety measures. These 
parameters are always fraught with a certain degree of uncertainty (Piarc, 2008a).  
 
However, even if there are many differences in current road tunnel QRA methods, 
most of them consist of the same following modeling steps (Xiaobo et al., 2011): 
 
1. Identification of all possible hazards such as fire, explosions, leaks and flood as top 
events. 
2. Fault trees and event tree analysis for each top event. Event tree consists of a 
number of particular scenarios triggered by the top event and fault tree analysis is 
used to estimate the probability of a top event that could occur. Then, consequence 
estimation models can be applied to calculate the expected number of fatalities for 
various scenarios involved in the event tree.  
3. After obtaining probability and fatality of each scenario, the societal risk and 
expected value is estimated. Smoke dispersion calculations are particularly used 
for fire scenarios in order to estimate the extent of the areas affected, where the 
consequences may cause fatalities to the exposed population. The smoke 
movement modeling varies from simple empirical relationships to complex CFD 
models. Moreover, evacuation calculations are employed in order to predict the 
expected number of people in those areas, varying also from empirical 
relationships to complex simulation models. 
4. Having estimated the risk level of the tunnel, the last step is to evaluate the results 
and determine if additional risk reduction measures are needed. 
 
Therefore, what seems to be clearly common in current QRAs applied in road tunnels 
is their event-based accident model (i.e. fault and event trees) combined with 
simulation tools so as to estimate the expected number of fatalities. If the estimated 
number is out of the predefined acceptable limits, then the tunnel is regarded unsafe 
and additional safety measures (mostly technical equipment) are proposed. The 
process is iterative and stops when the estimated risk is accepted. However, adding 
only technical equipment (a defense in depth strategy) is neither a cost-effective nor 
the most appropriate way to improve safety. The interested reader can refer to 
Høj.and Kröger (2002) for more information about the underlying concept of current 
QRAs in road tunnels.  
 
Nevertheless, the causal chains and event modeling (i.e. fault and event trees) of 
QRAs have been subject to strong criticism for their limitations to capture the overall 
risk picture of complex socio-technical systems (Rasmussen, 1997; Hollnagel, 2004; 
Leveson, 2004). Indeed, the chain-of-event conception of accidents typically used in 
QRAs cannot account for the indirect, non-linear, and feedback relationships that 
characterize many accidents in complex systems and such a type of analysis has 
limitations to handle safety critical factors such as human behavior, organizational 
aspects, software errors, design flaws, and risk migration over time (Apostolakis 
2004; Leveson 2004). Since road tunnels have organizational, social and managerial 
dimensions that impact their safety, it is considered of outmost importance to examine 
whether the general limitations of QRAs, as have been highlighted in the literature, 
also exist in the road tunnels field. Due to its significance for the purposes of this 
work, this issue is analyzed in detail in paragraphs 2.2 – 2.7. 
 
2.2 Lack of data and uncertainties 
 
In order to perform a QRA, specific data is needed as input, since such an approach is 
based on calculating historical data-based probabilities (Steen and Aven, 2011). 
However, in the road tunnel field such kind of data (i.e. accident frequencies, reaction 
time of tunnel users, reliability of the tunnel equipment, etc.) is often either 
incomplete or not available at all (Nývlt et al, 2011). QRA is based on combining the 
probabilities of simple events to obtain the probabilities of system failures and this is 
the reason why it is quite difficult for QRA to deal with the absence of data 
concerning the reliability of all the components. Furthermore, the probability of a fire 
starting in a tunnel or the probability of an accident occurring cannot be calculated 
reliably since there is not a uniform, comprehensive and obligatory reporting of 
accidents and incidents in road tunnels (Beard and Cope, 2008). Apart from the lack 
of statistical data and the difficulty to calculate the probability of a tunnel accident, it 
is also very difficult to estimate the consequences of such accidents (Haack, 2002). It 
is hard to predict exactly how a fire may develop in a tunnel due to the numerous 
specific conditions that influence the situation (number and type of burning vehicles, 
location of fire, number and behavior of tunnel users, time to activate appropriate 
actions etc.). In this context, it is obvious that it is very difficult for a QRA to 
establish a reliable overall risk picture. One might claim that all the aforementioned 
uncertainties exist independently of whether we perform a QRA or not and by 
attempting to quantify the uncertainties, QRA will contribute to the understanding of 
road tunnels safety issues (Apostolakis, 2004). Even if this is true, quantifying risk by 
using the expected number of fatalities gives the impression that the risk can be 
expressed in a very precise way (Aven, 2003). This is definitely not the case in road 
tunnels, where risk indices include a too strong element of arbitrariness since the 
probability of accidents cannot be easily measured and the consequences cannot be 
precisely estimated. 
 
2.3 Human errors and behavior during accident conditions 
 
The driver error has been regarded as the causal factor in many road accidents 
(Larsson et al., 2009) so it is only natural to wonder whether the potential of such 
errors could be incorporated into QRA. Human errors in general are divided in errors 
of omission (neglecting to perform a well defined procedure) and errors of 
commission (deliberately undertaking an action not specified in procedures; Reason, 
1990).  Errors of commission have been considered impossible to analyze and the 
simple engineering-style models used in QRA does not capture some of the important 
influences on error probabilities, sometimes referred as “the error-prompting context” 
(Apostolakis, 2004). This is in line with Leveson (2011a) and Rasmussen (1997) who 
also state that the way we design the environment or context in which humans operate 
is fundamental as far as safety is concerned, and this context cannot be adequately 
depicted in fault and event trees analysis. Moreover, by simply identifying and 
assessing human “failures” (e.g. the tunnel operator did not effectively use the 
ventilation system) in fault trees, it is not possible to make progress in designing and 
operating safer tunnels. The risk assessment must identify how specific hazardous 
human behavior might occur, so as to evaluate the current design and propose 
mitigation measures, in order to avoid such hazardous behaviors.  
 
As far as modeling the motorists’ evacuation in case of an emergency in a road tunnel 
is concerned (a crucial step in current QRA models), researches have shown that this 
subject remains elusive (Nilsson et al, 2009). Zarboutis (2007) has proposed an agent-
based modeling as an approach to capture a number of psychological crowd effects on 
individual psychomotor behavior, which in turn influence crowd behavior in tunnels. 
However, this method is aiming at designing plans for emergency rescue rather than 
predicting the evolution of the evacuation process. Experimental results (Nilsson et al, 
2009) have shown that social influence is particularly important during evacuation in 
road tunnels, (i.e. people are influenced by the behavior of others). Other aspects such 
as evacuation messages, the magnetism of emergency exits (e.g. flashing lights) and 
the kind of information provided to the motorists during the evacuation, also affect the 
evacuation process (Piarc, 2008b). Notwithstanding, all the aforementioned aspects 
are omitted from tunnel QRAs. Concluding, queuing and network models that 
simulate the evacuation during an emergency in a road tunnel and are explicitly used 
in current QRA tunnel models may be useful tools to design appropriate safety 
barriers and escape routes, but they cannot be used afterwards in order to evaluate the 
design they have themselves proposed. For the safety evaluation of the tunnel design 
another approach is needed. 
 
2.4 Organizational factors and safety culture 
 
Management shortcomings, organizational aspects and the safety culture have been 
recognized as major factors in the occurrence of accidents in complex systems 
(Leveson 2004; Rasmussen 1997; Reason 1990; Reason 1997). As a result, the effect 
of organizational factors on QRAs has attracted great research effort and still poses a 
challenging research agenda at the interface of engineering and social science. Despite 
the notable attempts of some researchers to quantify organizational aspects (Pate-
Cornell and Murphy, 1996; Mohaghegh and Mosleh, 2009), it is generally agreed that 
QRAs have limitations to capture the influence of management (Apostolakis, 2004). 
The authors of this work do not share the opinion of many safety experts that “QRAs 
do not include organizational factors. Case closed!” since there is little research to 
prove the validity of this statement. The field of QRAs is under constant development 
and in some industries QRAs have been applied taking into consideration 
organizational aspects (Skogdalen and Vinnem, 2011).  
 However, in the road tunnels field, a framework to describe human and organizational 
factors (HOFs) has not been proposed yet, hence the current methods omit 
organizational factors from their analysis. Organizational responsibilities in the 
tunnels field may vary from country to country; however, common organizational 
aspects that greatly affect safety include (Piarc, 2007): 
- Traffic management and decisions concerning speed limits and allowing the 
transportation of hazardous materials through a tunnel.  
- Maintenance and inspection of the tunnel. 
- Recruitment of the tunnel staff and its training procedures.  
- Preparation of emergency plans and procedures, planning of emergency exercises 
and co-operation with the emergency services. 
- Analysis of past incidents and the learning from events. 
 
All the aforementioned activities are undeniably safety critical aspects. Accidents 
frequency, emergency preparedness, emergency response and mitigation of the 
consequences of an accident are all aspects highly dependent on the organizational 
and inter-organizational structure. The fact that organizational factors are not included 
in the safety assessment is thus a striking weakness of current QRAs methods.  
 
2.5 Software errors 
 
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems are widely used in 
modern road tunnels to monitor and control tunnel equipment. The SCADA allows 
efficient maintenance and proper reaction of the tunnel operator in case of an 
emergency. Usually, SCADA monitors and controls the following equipment 
systems: 
- power supply system 
- tunnel ventilation system 
- tunnel lighting system  
- fire fighting system  
- fire detection system  
- tunnel communication system   
- traffic management system  
In case of an emergency, pre-programmed equipment configuration actions are 
activated by the SCADA or are proposed for validation to the tunnel operator. Hence, 
the SCADA system is a safety critical component of the tunnel system. In order to 
ensure its safe operation, the SCADA software is usually required to be written in 
accordance with the latest issue of an internationally recognized standard. 
Nevertheless, such a requirement ensures reliability and not safety. As Garret and 
Apostolakis (1999) state: “Software reliability assessment and software risk 
assessment are entirely unrelated. Reliability assessment is considered with the 
probability that the execution of the code will deviate from its specifications, whereas 
risk assessment is concerned with the likelihood that a software action will lead to the 
occurrence of a hazardous condition”.  
 
Safety risk assessment in road tunnels should investigate which actions of SCADA 
might lead to the occurrence or to the escalation of an accident. The question is 
whether QRAs can capture accidents arising from SCADA’s operation. The “software 
failure” box found in many fault trees of QRAs might be a sign that this method has 
reached its efficacy limits in the analysis of software accidents (Leveson, 1995). 
Trying to calculate the probability that the software will fail and reflect it in fault trees 
by containing boxes that indicate “SCADA Fails” does not make sense without first 
understanding in what ways the SCADA may fail. Nevertheless, the behavior of the 
SCADA software is not random; software is not a source of uncertainty (Garret and 
Apostolakis, 1999). The SCADA system will act as it has been designed to act, thus 
the source of uncertainty is really in the context which may force the software to 
produce the hazardous result. This context is not actually assessed by QRA methods 
(Leveson 1995). 
 
2.6 System accidents 
 
As the design of tunnel equipment systems has become safer and more reliable, the 
causes of accidents are more likely to be attributed to the interactions among the 
tunnel’s equipment systems, rather than due to individual systems failure. Examples 
of unpredicted and hazardous interactions that may occur in a road tunnel are the 
following:  
- Unsafe interaction between fire fighting and ventilation system (i.e. water droplets 
may be affected by the air flow provided by the tunnel ventilation system).  
- The tunnel communication systems may be disturbed due to high noise resulting 
from the operation of the ventilation system. 
-  High ventilation velocity in the tunnel may affect the ability of fire detection 
systems to quickly detect smoke (Arralt and Nilsen, 2009). 
  
In the aforementioned examples none of the components fails to fulfill its 
requirements. Instead, it is the interaction among perfectly functioning components 
that creates a hazardous system state. Treating such events as independent may lead to 
unrealistic tunnel risk assessment and to a large underestimation of the true risk. 
Perrow (1984) coined the term system accidents to describe such accidents that arise 
in the interaction among components and Leveson (2004) claims that QRAs have 
limitations to assess such common-cause accidents. Tunnel equipment should not be 
considered and evaluated as separate entities but as part of an integrated safety system 
and the existing road tunnels QRAs have limitations to do that. 
 
 
2.7 Adaptation of the tunnel system over time 
 
The traditional view of QRA is that it is an activity carried out at the beginning of a 
system’s lifecycle, providing a “snapshot” of the risk associated with the system 
design. However, many road tunnels that are initially designed and built with 
adequate safety margins have migrated to a state of increasing risk over time. This is 
mainly due to the lack of management commitment (e.g. poor maintenance) or 
because the system changes over time (different traffic volume, different portion of 
dangerous goods vehicles in the traffic, etc.). In both cases the dynamic feedback 
processes that may cause risk to increase over time must be defined and QRA is 
unable to do that (Dulac and Leveson, 2005). When looking at QRAs in road tunnels 
it seems that there is no link between the design stage conditions and the actual 
conditions of a tunnel. In this static view of the tunnel system it is implied that the 
tunnel equipment and the safety measures do not degrade through time. This seems to 
be a narrow perspective since systems tend to involve a migration to a state of 
increasing risk over time (Rasmussen, 1997). Adaptation or change is an inherent part 
of any system, particularly those that include human and organizational components 
(Leveson, 2004). Rasmussen (1997) has argued that major accidents are often caused 
by the migration of the system to hazardous states. The critical factor is that such 
adaptation is not a random process thus should be predictable and controllable. The 
risk assessment in road tunnels should reveal how the system may degrade over time 
and the QRA modeling lacks in feedback mechanisms to provide such kind of 
information. 
 
3. The need for a new approach to road tunnel safety assessment  
 
In a nutshell, QRA treats tunnel accidents as random phenomena although the system 
design errors and the insufficiency in predicting the interactions among tunnel 
components (electromechanical, digital, human and social such as emergency services 
and tunnel operator actions) giving rise to accidents are not really random events. 
QRA is performed mainly by using event-based accident models (i.e. fault trees and 
event trees analysis) which explain accidents in terms of multiple events sequenced as 
a chain over time. The events considered almost always involve some type of 
component failure (e.g. ventilation failure) or human error (e.g. 
driver/operator/emergency service error). These sequential accident or event-based 
accident models according to Hollnagel (2004) are limited in their capability to 
explain accident causation in more complex socio-technical systems. As Leveson 
(2011a) refers “In event-based models, the causal factors identified depend on the 
events that are considered and the selection of the conditions related to those events. 
However the choice of events to include is subjective and the selection of conditions 
to explain the events is even more so”. Events chains developed to explain an accident 
concentrates on the proximate events. Nevertheless, the foundation of an accident 
may lay years before in the engineering and management decisions. 
 
Component failures as initiating events are also inadequate explanations for major 
accidents in road tunnels. Investigations have shown that the causes of tunnel 
accidents are much more complex, involving factors at all levels of the system, from 
component failures to organizational and social factors. In the Mont-Blanc accident, 
for instance, it was concluded that fatal consequences could have been greatly 
reduced by a more efficient operation of emergency services, more skilled personnel, 
more powerful safety systems and higher awareness among users (Lacroix, 2001). 
Furthermore, the tunnel system (both the organizational and technical) had been 
degraded before the accident (Lacroix, 2001). The fire in the truck triggered the loss, 
but the catastrophe occurred due to systemic causes, not just because of an 
unfortunate coincidence of factors.     
 
However, any attempt to manage risk and evaluate safety requires an underlying 
model of how accidents happen. This underlying model also influences the strategies 
that an organization uses. If the model focuses on human error and component 
failures, the most risk reduction will tend to reduce the effects of human errors and 
component failures neglecting other important factors.  As Lundberg (2009) states 
what you look for in an accident analysis is what you actually find and fix. Thus, if 
the aim of a road tunnel risk assessment is to give the impression that risk can be 
expressed in a very precise way so as to satisfy the tunnel managers and insurances 
companies, QRAs may certainly achieve that purpose. On the contrary, if the aim of 
safety risk assessment is to establish a risk picture and identify factors, conditions, 
activities and systems that are important with respect to safety, then arbitrary risk 
indices such as the expected value formulation used in road tunnels safety assessment 
is not an enough safety effort.  
 
 Awareness of risk is a major component of safety-related decision making and in this 
section we have presented that QRAs do not take into account some of the most 
important factors that influence road tunnels safety such as organizational aspects, 
system accidents, software errors, human errors and adaptation of the tunnel system 
over time. On the one hand improvements can be made in current road tunnel QRAs 
in order to cope with some of the aforementioned limitations. Following this line of 
thought road tunnel QRAs can be enhanced with human reliability analysis (HRA) 
and common-cause-failure analysis (CCF). HRA deals with methods for 
modeling human error while CCF deals with methods for evaluating the effect of 
inter-system and intra-system dependencies which tend to cause simultaneous failures 
and thus significant increases in overall risk (Skogdalen and Vinnem 2011). 
Moreover, Bayesian Belief Networks (BBN) can be used in order to cope with 
uncertainty. However, we believe that there is a need for a resolution in the road 
tunnel safety assessment, a need to see beyond probabilities when trying to assess the 
safety level of those critical infrastructures. Even if the events triggering an accident 
may be regarded as random events, the ‘uncertainty’ of the tunnel system to control 
the trigger event and avoid the accident is not really a random phenomenon. This type 
of risk (that may indeed determine the extent of the accident) is potentially knowable 
and not some amorphous property denoted by probability and fatality estimates. Aven 
(2010) makes his point clear: “the risk cannot be adequately described and evaluated 
simply by reference to summarizing probabilities and expected values.” . Steen and 
Aven (2011) also stress that in order to analyze systemic accidents there is a need for 
concepts and tools that see beyond the probabilistic world. There is a need for a new 
paradigm. 
 
Systemic accident models have been particularly useful in helping analysts probe into 
the complicated interactions among system components that may lead to unfortunate 
events hence; it might worth trying to describe tunnel’s uncertainties and risks with 
such a model.  Following this line of thought, in this article we introduce a systemic 
accident causation model in the road tunnel safety topic and propose a STAMP-based 
method as an alternative or even complementary approach to road tunnel safety 
assessment.  
4 Introducing STAMP in road tunnel safety assessment   
4.1. The STAMP approach 
 
The STAMP (Systems-Theoretic Accident Model and Processes) is a systemic 
accident model that has been recently proposed by Leveson (2004). The model is 
based on the two major pairs of ideas underlying systems theory and systems thinking 
(Checkland, 1981): 
1. Emergence and hierarchy 
2. Communication and control 
 
The term ‘systemic’ is significantly broad, but is adopted to indicate that STAMP 
covers both the technical and the organizational dimension. Based on a systems 
approach, STAMP focuses on systems considered as a whole, not on parts considered 
separately. This systems theoretic approach treats safety as an emergent property that 
arises when the system components interact with the environment. Emergent 
properties, like safety, are controlled or enforced by a set of constraints related to the 
behavior of the system components. Hence, it is the inadequate or inappropriate 
control of safety-related constraints on the design, development and operation of the 
system that mainly causes accidents, not just a series of random events. STAMP 
includes traditional failure-based models as a subset but goes beyond physical failures 
to include causal factors involving interaction among non-failing components, 
software and design errors, errors in human decision-making and various 
organizational and managerial factors (Leveson 2004). 
  
The three basic concepts of the STAMP model are: 
- Safety constraints: Safety-related constraints are relationships among system 
variables, safety barriers and processes that prevent the system from reaching 
hazardous states. Leveson (2004) emphasizes safety constraints, rather than failure 
events, as the most basic concept in accident analysis. Instead of viewing accidents 
as the result of events, accidents are considered as the result of interaction among 
systems’ components that result in a violation of safety-related constraints. The 
controlled processes (organizational and technical) that enforce these constraints   
must limit system behavior to the safe changes and adaptations (Checkland, 1981). 
Therefore, a socio-technical control structure that controls the aforementioned 
processes and enforces the necessary constraints on systems development and 
operation must be designed.  
- Hierarchical safety control structures: The hierarchical safety control structure 
represents the components of the socio-technical system that enforce the 
aforementioned safety constraints (i.e. the controllers). A hierarchical multilevel 
model of stakeholders is posited in STAMP, similar to the model of Rasmussen 
(1997), but more expanded. Every level in this hierarchical model can impose 
safety constraints that in turn contribute to accident prevention and safety. On the 
contrary, accidents result due to improper imposition or control of constraints. An 
example of a hierarchical safety control structure is given by Leveson (2004, 
pp.257). 
- Process models and control loops: Hierarchies in systems theory are characterized 
by control and communication processes operating at the interfaces between levels. 
Control loops operate between the hierarchical levels of each control structure that 
have a downward (i.e. reference) channel providing the information or commands 
necessary to impose the constraints in the level below and a measuring channel to 
provide feedback measurements about how effectively the constraints were 
enforced. Finally, each controller at all levels of the hierarchical control structure 
(and not just at the lower physical levels) must have a process model of the process 
being controlled (i.e. a model of the system). Briefly, whether the model is 
embedded in an automated controller or in the mental model maintained by a 
human controller “it must contain the same type of information: the required 
relationship among the system variables (the control laws), the current state of the 
process and the ways the process can change state” (Leveson, 2004). Figure 1 
presents a basic control loop in STAMP.  
 
Figure 1. A basic process control loop in STAMP (Quyang et al., 2010). 
In STAMP terms, accidents result from inadequate control, i.e., the control loop 
creates or does not handle dysfunctional interactions in the process. Dysfunctional 
interactions can be caused either by component failures or/and by design flaws.  Thus, 
the process that leads to accidents can be understood in terms of flaws in the 
components of the system development and operation. STAMP provides a useful 
classification of control flaws leading to hazards. This classification is presented in 
figure 2. In each control loop at each level of the socio-technical control structure, 
potential inadequate control actions may include: (1) the controller may issue 
inadequate control actions, (2) control actions may be inadequately executed and (3) 
there may be missing or inadequate feedback. These general factors apply at each 
level of the socio-technical control structure, but the applications of the factors at each 
level may differ (Leveson, 2004).   
 
Figure 2: A classification of control flaws (Leveson, 2004)  
 
The STAMP accident model has been used to analyze many major accidents, such as 
a public water supply contamination accident that happened in a small town of 
Walkeron, a Friendly Fire Accident (Leveson, 2011b) and a railway accident in China 
(Quyang et al., 2010). Apart from accident analysis, the model has also been used for 
risk assessment and hazard analysis of several socio-technical systems (Dulac and 
Leveson, 2005; Leveson, 2011b; Hardy and Guarnieri 2010). A STAMP based risk 
assessment considers the technical (including hardware and software), 
human/organizational factors and the adaptation of the analyzed system over time. 
Thus, it worth trying to adopt the STAMP in the road tunnel field, where, as already 
discussed in Section 3, organizational aspects, human errors, software design and the 
dynamic nature of the tunnel system influence to a great extent the overall safety. 
 
4.2  STAMP implementation: Illustrative example in tunnel ventilation system 
 
To illustrate the STAMP-based road tunnel safety risk assessment method introduced 
in this paper, the proposed framework is applied to the analysis of a tunnel ventilation 
system. The choice to analyze only a particular system component and not a whole 
tunnel system might hide the major ability of the proposed method to describe the 
interactions among tunnel subsystems (i.e. tunnel ventilation system, fire fighting 
system, fire detection system, tunnel communication system and traffic management 
system). Moreover, crucial elements of tunnel safety and particularly the co-operation 
between the tunnel operator and emergency services are also omitted from our 
analysis. However, the authors prefer to demonstrate the framework in a particular 
tunnel subsystem in order to present the method as thoroughly as possible, even if 
some advantages of the technique are not highlighted, due to space limitations.  
Recommendations of how to apply the method for the whole tunnel system are made, 
so as to explain how the proposed framework can be used for the assessment of the 
overall tunnel safety.         
 
4.2.1 Case description 
In the road tunnels safety field, much attention is paid to the ventilation system and 
particularly to its ability to maintain a smoke-free evacuation route for the tunnel 
users in the early phase of a fire incident (self-rescuing phase). The time for arrival of 
emergency services, in case of fire in a tunnel, is very variable, depending mainly on 
the traffic condition. Therefore, the ventilation system is one of the most important 
safety measures in tunnels, since it affects smoke propagation, temperatures in the fire 
zone, concentration of contaminants, visibility, etc. (Carvel et al., 2001). The 
ventilation strategy to be adopted depends on the particular tunnel geometry, traffic 
density and whether the tunnel is bidirectional or unidirectional (Piarc, 2011). Since 
this paper focuses on the safety assessment technique, the information presented in 
this section is limited to what the authors regard crucial for the implementation of the 
STAMP-based road tunnel safety assessment. For more technical information about 
this topic the interested reader is referred to Carvel et al. (2001), Piarc (2011) and the 
references therein. 
The examined case study is a typical long twin bore unidirectional tunnel, equipped 
with longitudinal ventilation system, supervised by a SCADA system and a manned 
control centre. The case described herein represents a typical design of tunnel 
ventilation met in many countries (Piarc, 2011). In a longitudinal ventilation system 
the air is introduced or removed from the tunnel at a limited number of points, such as 
portals. In the examined case the required longitudinal airflow is provided through a 
set of ceiling mounted jet fans. 
If a fire occurs in a tunnel, hot smoke rises due to buoyancy forces. This separation 
between the hot upper layers and cooler layers is termed stratification and it is a 
temporary phenomenon that experience shows lasts for about 15 minutes. After that 
time, smoke completely fills the tunnel both downstream and upstream of the fire. 
Very often the longitudinal airflow is low and the smoke moves against the 
ventilation stream; a phenomenon called back-layering (Piarc, 2011). 
Ventilation systems such as the one examined are usually designed on the provision 
of minimum longitudinal air velocity to avoid back-layering, the so-called critical 
velocity. During emergency, the goal of the examined ventilation system is to 
maintain tenable conditions mainly upstream the fire, supposing that the tunnel is not 
congested and the vehicles downstream the fire will have the opportunity to exit the 
tunnel unhindered (Piarc, 2011), as shown in figure 3. 
 
 
 Figure 3. Fire-induced smoke longitudinal control   
 
The examined ventilation system is controlled by the SCADA system as follows: In 
the normal operating mode of the tunnel, the system works in an automated mode, 
without any intervention of the tunnel operator. The control in this ventilation mode is 
associated with measured pollution and opacity levels (e.g CO, dust and NO 
thresholds). When measurements are monitored over the predefined threshold, the 
SCADA activates a particular number of jet fans in order to reduce the concentration 
of CO and other pollutants. For cost effective ventilation operation in the normal 
mode, the SCADA avoids starting a jet fan that has reached a maximum number of 
starts per hour. Moreover, a jet fan’s vibration information is monitored and if it is 
measured over a threshold the SCADA also does not activate the particular jet fan. 
On the other hand, the fire ventilation mode is not really an automated mode, but a 
pre-programmed sequence of actions in a manual mode. A validation of fire detection 
by the tunnel operator is equivalent to a launch of commands to start and execute the 
right operation procedure, which is a function of the fire position. The ventilation 
process for the fire ventilation mode has two phases. In phase 1, the pre-ventilation 
phase is initiated: A fire has been detected and the ventilation system is prepared to 
operate quickly if the tunnel operator confirms the fire event. If there is a false alarm, 
the tunnel operator adjusts the ventilation to the normal mode. If a fire is confirmed, 
then the phase 2, the smoke management phase, is activated. Thus, the phase 2 is 
based on a waiting loop expecting the tunnel operator’s validation. The aim of phase 2 
is the internal airflow to reach the target critical velocity, as defined by the designers 
of the ventilation system. The predefined number of jet fans to run for each fire 
scenario is an initial value of the algorithm, specific for each tunnel. The non-incident 
(escape) tube ventilation (as has been mentioned, the tunnel is twin bore) is also set up 
aiming at avoiding smoke recycling at the portal by limiting the pressure differences 
between the two tubes. Finally, the jet fan starting procedure is based on a star delta 
start system, meaning that the SCADA is managing the time between each start of the 
installation, to limit an electrical overload. As a result, the start up of the required jet 
fans is sequential at each electrical substation of the tunnel even in phase 2 (fire 
ventilation mode). The starting is depending on a timer setting in the SCADA, with 
usual default values at 5 seconds.      
The examined case described above is a typical design of tunnel ventilation system 
used in twin bore unidirectional road tunnels. Accident scenarios, deterministic or 
probabilistic risk assessment and simulation models mainly drive the design of 
ventilation systems. Even if another type of ventilation or SCADA is installed in a 
road tunnel, the basic principles underlying the safety assessment presented in this 
article would not be affected. In the next paragraph, the STAMP-based road tunnel 
safety risk assessment is introduced to identify how the particular ventilation system 
might prove inadequate to control the fire, even if a QRA has been performed and 
claimed that the tunnel is safe. Moreover, the aspects that must be examined in order 
to decide whether the tunnel system is safe or not (as far as the smoke control is 
concerned) are presented. The STAMP analysis consists of four main steps (fig. 4), 
which are analyzed in detail. 
Step 1: Identify accidents, system hazards, safety 
requirements  and safety control structure
Step 2: Identify inadequate control actions and 
determine component safety constraints
Step 3: Identify possible control flaws
Step 4: Evaluate the road tunnel safety and 
establish a proactive safety strategy
The STAMP-based road tunnel safety risk assessment
 
Figure 4. Methodology steps of the STAMP-based analysis   
4.2.2 Step 1: Identify accidents, high level hazards, safety constraints and the 
safety control structure  
The first thing to be done in any safety effort involves agreeing on the types of 
accidents or losses to be considered. Then, the high level hazards that might lead to 
the particular accident must be defined. A hazard is a system state or set of conditions 
that, together with a particular set of environmental conditions may lead to an 
accident (Leveson, 2004). 
In the road tunnel field, the main undesired events that may result in losses (i.e. 
accidents) are (Piarc, 2008a): 
1. Fire in a tunnel 
2. Explosion in a tunnel 
3. Release of toxic gas in a tunnel 
4. Traffic accidents (e.g. vehicle collisions) 
5. Flooding 
In this paper the proposed safety assessment method focuses on the following 
accident: Human losses/injuries and tunnel damage due to a fire in a tunnel (i.e. 
the first one mentioned in the above list). The high-level hazards that may lead to the 
accident are: 
- Dangerous driving in the tunnel 
- Inadequacy of the tunnel ventilation system to control smoke and fire in the initial 
(self-rescuing) phase of a fire  
- Inability of the road users to rescue themselves 
- Inability of the tunnel operator to effectively intervene and provide the appropriate 
actions 
- Inability of the emergency services to control the incident  
It must be mentioned that for a complete risk assessment of the whole tunnel, all the 
aforementioned accidents and hazards must be identified. However, in order to 
demonstrate the method we focus only on the particular hazard: “Inadequacy of the 
tunnel ventilation system to control smoke and fire in the initial (self-rescuing) 
phase of a fire”.  
Having identified the system hazard, the next step in the safety risk assessment is to 
determine the high-level safety requirements and constraints that must be enforced in 
order to control the particular hazard. It is mentioned that safety requirements 
represent the reason for the existence of the system (in terms of safety) while 
constraints represent acceptable ways that the system can achieve those goals. High-
level safety requirements and constraints are identified by analyzing the way the 
hazard could occur, by past experience on similar hazards and by safety guidelines. 
The high level safety requirement and the high level constraints for this particular 
hazard are: 
High level requirement of tunnel ventilation system: to provide the tunnel users 
escape routes with tenable levels of temperature, toxicity and visibility from both 
downstream and upstream the fire.  
High level safety constraints that must be enforced in order to address the safety 
requirement are:  
 
1. In case of fire, the ventilation operation needs to be changed from normal mode to 
smoke management mode as quickly as possible. 
2. The longitudinal air flow velocity must be reliably controlled to avoid de-
stratification and back-layering of the smoke. 
3. The operator must be well trained so as to react within the time available and under 
high stress conditions. Moreover he must adjust the ventilation strategy according 
to the information available. 
4. The ventilation system must be well maintained and tested so as to provide the 
necessary air flow capacity. 
The next step is to identify the controllers who enforce the above high-level safety 
constraints in the safety control structure. Leveson (2011b) has proposed specific 
criteria about who should be included in a safety control structure. However, in our 
simple examined case (i.e. without complex organizational structures) we include 
every component of the tunnel system (human, organizational, automation) that plays 
a role in the enforcement of the high level safety requirement and constraints 
identified so far. The safety control structure of a typical road tunnel (at least a tunnel 
that is conformed to European Directive 2004/54) is presented in figure 5 and the 
roles and responsibilities for each component in the structure are also discussed.  
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Figure 5: The tunnel hierarchical safety control structure 
 
The Tunnel Manager is responsible for the day to day operation and safety of the 
tunnel. He forms working instructions, draws up the maintenance strategy and is 
responsible for the recruitment and training of the tunnel staff. 
The Safety Officer takes part in the implementation and evaluation of emergency 
operations, verifies that the operational staff is trained and must also take part in the 
organization of exercises. Lastly, he examines whether the tunnel structure and 
equipment is maintained and repaired.  
The maintenance personnel’s role is to intervene on the technical facilities of the 
tunnels in a preventive and corrective way as it has been planned by the tunnel 
manager.  
Designers and contractors affect tunnel safety to a great extent. It must be crystal-
clear that tunnels safety during operation greatly depends on the original design and 
development of the tunnel system. 
In the operating process the two main controllers are the tunnel operator (often named 
traffic operator if the tunnel is included in a controlled high way section) and the 
SCADA system. The role of the SCADA system is to propose a pre-programmed fire 
control scenario to the tunnel operator to validate.  If the scenario is considered the 
appropriate, the mitigation action is activated by the tunnel operator.     
All the aforementioned controllers can be mapped in the safety control structure 
presented in figure 5 by control loops. 
4.2.3 Step 2: Identify inadequate control actions and determine component safety 
constraints  
The second step identifies how the safety requirements and constraints identified in 
step 1 could be violated. In STAMP terms, safety constraints are violated when the 
process model used by the controller who enforces them does not match the real 
process and as a result, the following four general types of inadequate control actions 
may occur:  
1. A required control action is not provided 
2. An incorrect or unsafe control action is provided 
3. A potentially correct control action is provided at the wrong time (e.g. too 
late) 
4. A potentially correct control action is stopped too early 
Inadequate control actions can arise at all levels of the safety control structure, thus all 
the components in the structure must be examined. It must be mentioned that some of 
the possible inadequate control actions may not be applicable for a controller. For, 
example, working instructions are provided or not. They cannot be provided too late, 
neither can be stopped too soon. The hazardous states that could occur due to the four 
general inadequate control actions are:  
In control loop 1 (i.e. from the Tunnel Manager and the Safety Officer): 
1. Working instructions are not provided by the tunnel management (Tunnel Manager 
and tunnel Safety Officer) to the tunnel operator or wrong/misleading working 
instructions are provided (i.e. they have not been updated). 
2. Specific recruitment and training requirements are not applied for the 
recruitment/training of the tunnel staff (tunnel operator and maintenance 
personnel), or the requirements do not match the required skills that must be 
accomplished. 
 
In control loop 2 (i.e. from designers/maintainers): 
1. The operating assumptions and the operational limitations for the ventilation 
system have not passed from the designers of the system to the tunnel operators. 
Similarly, safety critical components of the tunnel ventilation system are not given 
by the designers to the maintenance process for prioritization of effort. Even if this 
seems very difficult to happen we should keep in mind that road tunnels have a 
very long operating life and very few of those involved with the original planning 
and construction works will be available to share their knowledge with those 
coming after them to operate and maintain the tunnel. Consequently, if the 
assumptions of the design have not been recorded it is probable that operational 
quality will not be maintained. 
 
In control loop 3 (i.e. from tunnel operator and SCADA system): 
 
1. The tunnel operator and/or the SCADA system do not activate the tunnel 
ventilation system for the emergency. 
2. The ventilation system creates high longitudinal velocities downstream of the fire, 
the tunnel users have not evacuated that area, and therefore they are affected by the 
fire. Moreover, high longitudinal velocities feed the fire with oxygen creating 
enhancement of heat release rate. 
3. The tunnel operator waits too long to validate the alarm or the SCADA system is 
inadequate to activate the ventilation system quickly enough. 
4. The emergency ventilation mode is stopped before the fire event has been declared 
closed. 
 
The information provided in this step of the analysis is used to identify the more 
refined safety constraints on systems component behavior to prevent the identified 
system hazards. All the aforementioned inadequate control actions are turned into 
components’ safety constraints though a simple process. In order to develop the more 
refined safety constraints it would be also helpful to take into consideration guidelines 
and best practices used in the tunnel safety field. Concluding, the safety constraints 
that must be enforced are presented in Table 1: 
Table 1  
Safety constraints to be enforced 
    
Constraint Description of the safety constraint 
C1 Specific recruitment requirements that reflect the necessary required technical skills of 
tunnel personnel (maintenance agents, tunnel operator) must be well defined in parallel 
with a feedback mechanism that ensures that the tunnel personnel satisfies these 
requirements. 
C2 The working instructions provided to the tunnel operator must enable a quick response 
in case of an emergency. 
C3 Rigorous and ongoing training must be provided to the tunnel personnel in conjunction 
with a feedback mechanism which tests the effectiveness of the training procedures. 
C4 The operating assumptions and the operational limitations for the ventilation system 
must be recorded and passed from the designers of the system to the tunnel operators 
and maintainers. 
C5 Fire ventilation mode must be always activated if a fire exists in the tunnel. 
C6 The airflow provided by the ventilation system must prevent back-layering and smoke 
de-stratification for at least the first 10-15 minutes from the onset of the fire. 
C7 If people are situated downstream the fire they must not get fired. 
C8 The application of forced ventilation could assist the fire since it feeds the fire with 
oxygen. Thus, the tunnel operator must be able to identify the fire type, the exact 
situation and adjust the ventilation strategy accordingly. 
C9 The full operation of the smoke control must be achieved within 2-3 minutes from the 
onset of the fire. 
C10 The fire ventilation mode must not stop until the smoke is under control. 
 
For those involved in tunnel safety there may be an endogenous conflict in C6 to 
prevent both back-layering and smoke de-stratification. However, a safe system is not 
necessarily free of such conflicts. What really is of utmost importance for safety 
engineers is to be aware of these conflicts. 
 
In this step more refined components safety constraints are provided and a first 
assessment of the safety controls of a particular tunnel can be made, at least for safety 
control measures that enforce or do not enforce constraints C1-C4. The tunnel’s 
procedures must be thoroughly examined in this stage of the analysis.  For example 
does a quality plan or specific organizational procedures that enforce constraints C1-
C4 exist or have been designed (if the tunnel is under construction)? Does a Routine 
Maintenance Management System exist for the effective management of the 
maintenance of the tunnel? However, for constraints 5-10 the assessment is more 
complex and even if the appropriate safety constraints have been provided to the 
system through safety controls (i.e. smoke detectors are provided so as to activate the 
ventilation system, etc.) the safety constraints might still fail to be enforced and 
prevent the accident. In the next step the crux of the causal analysis is presented and 
the aspects that must be examined in the risk assessment are highlighted.      
 
4.2.4 Step 3: Determine how unsafe actions could occur and identify possible 
control flaws   
Step 3 of our analysis is the one that identifies the scenarios or paths leading to a 
hazard as found in a classic risk analysis. However, the guidance provided by 
Leveson (2004) with the control flaws terminology greatly helps the analysis process 
and more than just failures are taken into consideration. Identification of control flaws 
starts by examining each of the basic components of the loop 3 and determines how 
their improper operation may contribute to the general types of inadequate control as 
presented in 4.2.3 and consequently to the violation of constraints C5-C10 presented 
in Table 1.  
The general control flaws (figure 2) are mapped into the examined loop 3 as presented 
in figure 6.  
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Figure 6: The examined control loop of the fire ventilation process 
Thus, by working around the loop presented in figure 6 and examining the control 
flaws leading to accidents, the identified causal factors are: 
- Control inputs or external information wrong or missing 
The tunnel operator and the SCADA system co-operate with other components in the 
tunnel system. As a result, actions and outputs from other system components are 
needed in order to control the fire ventilation process. The safety constraints might be 
inadequately enforced or violated due to the following scenarios:  
 
a. The power supply has failed; the ventilation system has not the necessary input to 
start the fire ventilation process. Violation of C5-component failure. 
b. Fire detection has failed. Consequently, the tunnel operator and the SCADA 
system are not aware of the fact that a fire exists in the tunnel and the fire 
ventilation mode is not activated. Violation of C5-component failure. 
c. When a fire occurs, it will cause an increase in dust and CO levels. Before the 
levels are high enough to define a fire, the ventilation (normal operating mode) 
will have increased the ventilation rate. This rise in airflow will affect the time to 
detect the fire and turn the ventilation in a fire mode. Violation of C9-systemic 
factors.  
d. Inadequate/wrong working procedures have been given to the tunnel operator by 
the tunnel management concerning how to safely operate the ventilation system 
Violation of constraint C2-organizational factor. 
e. Frequently false alarms (wrong inputs) have created complacency during the 
tunnel operation. As a result, fire alarms do not immediately activate emergency 
procedures. The tunnel operator has slipped into a state of inertia. Violation of  C9-
human factor. 
It must be mentioned that the previous control flaws are resulting from the inadequate 
control of other controlled processes and from their safety constraints violation. Thus, 
in a detailed risk assessment the fire detection process and the power supply of the 
tunnel must also be carefully analyzed as they affect the fire ventilation mode to a 
great extent and can cause system accidents.  
 
- Inadequate control algorithm of SCADA system and tunnel operator (flaws in 
creation, incorrect modification or adaptation) 
 
Algorithms are the procedures designed by engineers for the SCADA system and the 
procedures that the tunnel operator follows for the emergency ventilation process. 
Scenarios that may violate the safety constraints belonging to this classification are:  
 
a. The predefined number of jet fans to run in order to avoid back-layering fails to 
achieve the necessary critical velocity. Violation of C6-design error. 
b. The fire ventilation mode cannot override the normal operation mode. 
Consequently, the SCADA avoids starting particular safety critical jet fans because 
they have reached the maximum number of starts per hour or because of the 
vibration threshold. Violation of C6-software error. 
c. The fire ventilation mode stops because of the CO, NO2 thresholds. Violation of 
C10-software error. 
d. The non-incident ventilation tube is inappropriately set up leading to smoke 
recycling due to the pressure differences between the two tubes. Violation of C6-
design error. 
e. The traffic volume has changed considerably during time. Although the ventilation 
system was initially effective, it is presently insufficient to control the fire and 
nobody has noticed the migration of the system to a hazardous state. Violation of 
C6- lack of feedback/organizational factor. 
f. The tunnel operator has inadequate understanding of his controlled authority. For 
example, he does not know that he can reverse electrically the flow of the jet fans 
although such an action is needed. Violation of C6-human error. 
g. The pre-programmed scenario proposed by SCADA is the appropriate but the 
tunnel operator cannot validate the scenario. This may be due to his absence of the 
control room without someone to stand in for him or due to his panic (cognition 
characteristics). Violation of C5-organizational factor. 
 
- Process model of SCADA system and tunnel operator inconsistent or 
incomplete 
The process model is the way both SCADA and the tunnel operator get informed 
about the fire ventilation process progress. When both the SCADA and the operator 
have a different perception of the tunnel environment than the real state, erroneous 
control commands may be provided. Scenarios which may lead to inadequate 
enforcement/violation of the safety constraints are the following: 
  
a. Anemometers coherency test performed by SCADA system has failed to detect 
that anemometers are out of order. As a result the SCADA system has an incorrect 
process model of the tunnel longitudinal ventilation velocity and inadequate air 
flow is provided. Violation of C6-component failure. 
b. Anemometers have not been calibrated due to poor maintenance policy. Violation 
of C6-organizational factor. 
c. The buoyant fire plume that is moving within the tunnel environment affects the 
anemometers operation; wrong airflow values are provided to the SCADA. 
Violation of C6-design error. 
d. The tunnel operator does not have sufficient feedback of the tunnel environment 
and the controlled process. The fire incident tunnel team, the sensors and 
communication with tunnels users does not provide the necessary information in 
order to update his mental model of the controlled process. The displays and the 
human machine interface of the SCADA might be not ergonomic enough. In a 
nutshell, the feedback information bandwidth is incorrectly designed. As a result, 
the pre-programmed scenario proposed by the SCADA system is validated by the 
tunnel operator although it is not the appropriate. For example, the scenario is 
based on the assumption that people downstream the fire have evacuated and 
applies forced ventilation. However, this is not the case; the tunnel operator 
incorrectly validates the scenario leading to tunnel users being exposed to fire. 
Violation of C7, C8-human error. 
 
- Inadequate operation of the actuators 
The scenarios discussed so far involved inadequate/hazardous control. What follows 
involves scenarios where adequate/safe control commands are produced but cannot be 
executed. 
 
a. Ventilation command transmission network fails; ventilation fans are not activated. 
Violation of C5, C6-component failures. 
b. Fans and dampers have not been constructed to withstand high temperatures and 
pressures, therefore during the fire some of them do not operate. Violation of C10-
design error. 
c. The jet fan starting procedure (as has already been mentioned is based on star-delta 
start system) brings about the delayed operation of safety critical jet fans. Violation 
of C9-design error. 
d. A reversed flow mode of jets fans has not been designed. Violation of C6-design 
error. 
e. Lack of operation, wrong working instructions and poor maintenance has resulted 
to the degradation of the ventilation equipment. Violation of C6-migration of the 
tunnel system to hazardous state. 
 
- Flaws due to the controlled process 
 
The final category concerns flaws due to the fire ventilation process itself. This 
category may also help us to identify component interaction accidents (system 
accidents).  
 
a. Atmospheric back pressure and external wind direction and velocity are out of the 
range the ventilation system has been designed to control. This is not regarded as a 
control algorithm flaw but an out of range external disturbance. 
b. Process outputs that may contribute to the system hazard are: 
- High longitudinal ventilation velocity feeds the fire with oxygen and increase 
the heat release rate of the fire. Violation of C8-systemic factors. 
- Untenable conditions downstream the fire due to high ventilation airflow in this 
direction. Violation of constraint C7-systemic factors. 
- The fire ventilation mode may result in high level noise, thus disturbing 
communications inside the tunnel. Violation of high-level safety requirement-
systemic factors.  
 
 
4.2.4 Step 4: Evaluating the road tunnel safety and establishing a proactive 
safety strategy  
After the end of step 3 of the analysis, the causal pathway leading to the accident has 
been described. Once the potential causes and hazards have been identified, the 
information of the STAMP-based road tunnel safety assessment must be provided to 
the Tunnel Manager and Safety Officer in order evaluate the current tunnel design, if 
the tunnel has been constructed, or in order to establish and enforce a proactive safety 
strategy, if the tunnel is under development. In this case, safety measures should be 
proposed that address the identified hazards. 
Safety control measures that must be evaluated (or enforced) may for example 
include: 
- Organizational procedures that enforce constraints C1-C4 as presented in Table 1. 
For example a quality plan or specific organizational procedures that define 
specific recruitment requirements, working instructions and the operator’s training 
should exist or should be designed. Additionally, a Routine Maintenance 
Management System for the effective management of the maintenance of the 
tunnel should exist or enforced. 
- Whether the ventilation-control routines (SCADA algorithm) ensure adequate 
response for all conceivable scenarios in the analysis as presented in 4.2.3. (i.e. 
people downstream the fire, need for reversed flow mode of jet fans, scenarios 
where some equipment is not available or where the measured data are lacking 
etc.). 
- Commissioning and periodic tests of the ventilation system that proves its 
capability to achieve its requirements.  
- Automated or scheduled maintenance procedures so as to examine the plausibility 
of anemometers and sensors. 
- Organizational procedures and incident analysis processes so as to determine if the 
tunnel organization detects the occurrence of the above hazardous scenarios and 
has the ability to “learn from events”. 
It must be mentioned, as far as the evaluation of tunnel safety is concerned, that risk 
indices which imply expected number of fatalities or probabilities of events deviates 
from the purpose of such type of analysis which is moreover insufficient to provide 
this kind of information. However, if the causal factors identified by the risk 
assessment must be categorized somehow accordingly to their risk level, a risk matrix 
can be used for the evaluation process.  
Risk matrices based on likelihood-consequence grids are commonly used to document 
the perception of the most critical risk in a system or in order to summarize the results 
of the risk assessment. However, since the proposed STAMP-based approach is not 
based on probabilities of events, a likelihood-consequence matrix cannot be provided. 
Therefore, an alternative approach to rank risks must be proposed. Aven (2010) gives 
an alternative definition that can be used somehow in the STAMP analysis. He states 
that risk can be understood as the two dimensional combination of:                                               
i. events A and consequences C of the events  
ii. the associated uncertainties U (will A occur and what value C will take) 
 
In STAMP terms, as events one may consider the inadequate control actions and 
control flaws identified in step 2 and 3 of the STAMP-based road tunnel safety risk 
assessment. The consequences of these events are the violation of the component 
level safety constraints. As far as their consequences are concerned, the ranking of the 
risks depends on which constraint is violated. In a qualitative risk matrix, a low, 
medium or high consequence value can be given to categorize the consequences of 
control flaws. For example, if we regard the constraint C7 “If people are situated 
downstream the fire they must not get fired” more important (i.e. its consequences are 
regarded more severe) than constraint C9 “The full operation of the smoke control 
must be achieved within 2-3 minutes from the onset of the fire”, then events (i.e. 
causal flaws and inadequate control actions) that violate constraint C7 might take the 
value ‘high’ while those which violate constraint C9 might take the value ‘medium’.   
 
Having classified the inadequate control actions and control flaws in terms of 
consequences, the next step is ranking them in terms of uncertainty. How uncertain is 
such an ‘event’ to occur depends mainly on the uncertainty of the safety control 
measure responsible to control the particular causal event. In order to assess the 
uncertainty of the safety controls to be violated we propose as a metric the 
observability parameter, a fundamental concept of Control Theory (Brogan, 1991). 
For example, a CCTV (Close Circuit TV) might be used as a safety control measure 
for the control flaw: “The tunnel operator does not have sufficient feedback of the 
tunnel environment and the controlled process”. The observability parameter of this 
safety control is high since the tunnel operator can easily observe if the control 
measure (i.e. the CCTV) is in operation or not. On the contrary, a safety control 
measure embedded in ventilation control routines and SCADA algorithm can be 
easily modified by the maintenance operator without anybody observing this 
modification. Hence, it has a low observability. As far as organizational procedures is 
concerned (as safety control measures), the ease with which procedures can be 
monitored and compliance detected, depends on various factors. For example, more 
complicated procedures are in general more difficult to monitor than simple 
procedures because there are more ways for them to be violated either intentionally or 
unintentionally. Furthermore, procedures that require specialized skills cannot be 
effectively monitored by personnel who do not have the same specialized skills. 
Consequently, such procedures have lower observability than procedures that require 
less specialized skills. Again a qualitative scale can be used to evaluate the 
observability parameter in a risk matrix. 
 
In this perspective, risks are classified according to their observability and 
consequence. Low observability, high consequences risks are deemed to be the most 
critical while high observability, low consequences risk are deemed to be less 
important.  A risk matrix which can be used as a way of summarizing the STAMP-
based safety risk assessment is shown in figure 7. However, it must be mentioned that 
the whole risk assessment must be provided to those taking decisions about the safety 
of the tunnel, since matrices are always based on a rough classification and high 
subjectivity from the analyst. 
    
Observability Consequences 
 
Low Medium High 
High Accepted Accepted 
to be 
examined 
Medium  Accepted 
to be 
examined not accepted 
Low 
to be 
examined not accepted not accepted 
Figure 7: Risk Matrix 
 
A final step in the STAMP-based assessment is to consider how the safety controls 
could degrade over time and to build protection against it in order to cope with the 
migration of the tunnel system in hazardous states. Protection might include, for 
example, planned technical audits based on the STAMP-based road tunnel safety risk 
assessment. The assumptions and results of the STAMP-assessment could be the 
preconditions for such operational audits. 
5 Discussion 
The analysis in the previous section showed how a ventilation system that has been 
designed to control fire and smoke can be proven insufficient to provide the tunnel 
users escape routes with tenable levels of temperature, toxicity and visibility. 
Moreover, the aspects that should be evaluated in order to determine its safety level 
have been highlighted. Notwithstanding the ability of STAMP to identify hazardous 
scenarios, it should be mentioned that the fire ventilation process is somehow more 
complex than the proposed assessment might imply. Ingason (2005) states that there 
is always significant uncertainty on how the tunnel ventilation affects certain fire 
characteristics (smoke evolution, flame length, HRR, etc.), hence there is no accident 
model that could reveal all hazardous scenarios when fire is the examined case. 
Accident models are simply a representation of reality and they must always be used 
in this perspective. However, it is crucial to understand that the accident model 
selected to perform the safety assessment is indeed the most crucial aspect and 
leverage in the safety evaluation process of a tunnel. The analysis of how an accident 
may happen provides the reality that the safety assessment must cope with. Accident 
models do not always focus on the same features or facets of this reality since they 
have been developed for different circumstances. The critical aspect is therefore to 
choose the one or a combination of some methods that can provide a comprehensive 
and thorough analysis. The limitations of current QRAs based on fault and event tree 
analysis have been exhaustively discussed in Section 2 and the need for a different 
approach was also highlighted in Section 3.  
On the other hand, the proposed method presented in this article, based on a systemic 
accident model, is regarded as an appropriate approach to model accidents in road 
tunnels, evaluate their safety and propose appropriate safety measures. The control 
theory and systems thinking framework of the method is regarded as an appealing 
construct for assessing tunnel safety because the factors (technical and organizational) 
that contribute to tunnel accidents are numerous, complex and interrelated. Moreover, 
as presented in paragraph 4.2, the STAMP-based risk assessment method succeeds in 
taking into consideration organizational aspects, design and software errors, systemic 
factors and the adaptation of the tunnel system, all aspects that current road tunnel 
QRAs have limitations to cope with. Following this line of thought, it is believed that 
the STAMP model can be helpful in the road tunnels field, particularly for the Safety 
Officers and the Tunnel Managers of the tunnel so as to better conceptualize the 
safety picture of these infrastructures. The authors believe that the application of an 
accident model to evaluate the overall tunnel safety as a complementary tool to 
traditional approaches is necessary. The analyst or/and the Safety Officer may be able 
to assess causal factors closely related in time and space by applying individual 
knowledge and expertise, but it is extremely difficult to effectively see the broad 
picture of the whole tunnel system and evaluate the overall safety without a 
systematic model. 
 It must be mentioned that in the present analysis the regulations and standards for 
road tunnels have not been analyzed. This decision has been made as the technique 
presented in this article refers to the Safety Officers and to the Tunnel Managers, who 
cannot influence or deviate from the regulations and standards. However, an analysis 
of the whole socio-technical system, including regulators, could be performed in the 
future, to evaluate the efficiency of the current standards and legislation.  
Like any other model or technique, STAMP has also limitations. It cannot drive the 
design of specific tunnel subsystems, so simulation models must always be used when 
decisions concerning the number of emergency exits or the capacity of ventilation 
system are made. Moreover, if risk must be quantified in accurate estimates (i.e. 
expected number of fatalities) a STAMP-based approach will certainly be unable to 
provide the required results. Risk in STAMP terms is not a function of probabilities 
and consequences of events as described in the classical approach of risk assessment 
(Kaplan, 1981) but a function of the effectiveness of controls to enforce safe system. 
In STAMP, risk is directly related to communication and feedback. The more and 
better the information we have about the potential causes of accidents in our system 
and the state of controls implemented to prevent them, the more accurate will be our 
perception of risk. Thus, in such type of safety risk assessment the information 
provided by the STAMP analysis must be presented to the Tunnel Manager and 
Safety Officer (decision-makers) as a basis for risk-informed decisions or as a tool to 
evaluate current road tunnels design. In this sense, decisions to be made will be based 
on a well described risk picture and not on some subjective risk numbers produced by 
probability estimates.  
Finally, some may claim that the presented method seems to have similarities with 
Failure Mode, Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) that is widely used for 
tunnel hazard analysis. However, FMECA is a bottom-up reliability engineering 
analysis technique whereas STAMP analysis is a top down safety analysis framework. 
Thus, the framework of the analysis significantly differs.  
6. Conclusion 
The evolution of accident causation models over time shows a shift from the sequence 
of events to the representation of the whole system (Katsakiori et al., 2009). Event-
based accident models that underlie QRAs have been subject to strong criticism for 
their limitations to capture the overall risk picture of complex socio-technical systems 
and a systemic approach is adopted as an alternative approach. In the road tunnels 
field the need for a systemic safety assessment has also been mentioned (Santos-
Reyes and Beard, 2005).This paper reviews the limitations of current QRAs in the 
road tunnels field and proposes a STAMP-based method as an alternative technique 
(or even complementary support tool) for road tunnel safety risk assessment.  
The concept of STAMP-based safety risk assessment in road tunnels has been 
introduced and illustrated through an analysis of a tunnel ventilation system.  
Nevertheless, the overall safety of a tunnel can be evaluated only if the STAMP-based 
safety risk assessment is performed for the whole tunnel system and for all the 
identified accidents and their associated hazards as mentioned in 4.2.2.  Particularly, 
dangerous driving in the tunnel, the inability of the road users to rescue themselves, 
the inability of the tunnel operator to effectively intervene and provide the appropriate 
actions and finally, the inability of the emergency services to control the incident 
should be analyzed with the steps of the STAMP analysis. In the whole tunnel system, 
the STAMP model will have the capability to examine interrelationships among 
tunnel systems (i.e. tunnel ventilation system, fire fighting system, fire detection 
system, tunnel communication system and traffic management system). Moreover, 
crucial elements of tunnel safety and particularly the co-operation of the tunnel 
operator and emergency services will be also examined in an overall tunnel safety 
assessment. The proposed method can be used either to evaluate a current tunnel 
design or to drive the design of a new road tunnel and in this work the STAMP has 
been complemented with a Risk Matrix in order to evaluate risk. However, future 
work should concentrate in developing methods and tools that have the ability to 
categorize the identified causal factors more thoroughly. The authors believe that in 
general, the STAMP technique must be supported with tools that improve the way the 
information provided by the STAMP analysis is presented to decision makers.  
Notions of systems theory in safety may be characterized as ‘organizing common 
sense’ therefore a more mathematical-based risk assessment method (such as QRAs) 
might be regarded with more esteem. However, it is important to understand that 
some properties cannot be described mathematically and this fact must not hinder the 
safety assessment. Indeed, the organizational and human influences on the safety level 
of a road tunnel are complicated enough in their causal relations and are therefore 
difficult to be represented quantitatively in numerical units. As a result, such factors 
are frequently left out of the analysis entirely, because it is argued that they cannot be 
estimated successfully. This means that the causal factors considered are not a 
comprehensive overview of aspects that have the potential to affect the overall tunnel 
safety, but a set of factors that can be quantitatively modeled. We conclude this article 
by reminding that the main benefit of assessing risk (quantitatively or qualitatively) 
lies in the achievement of a detailed understanding of the engineering system and this 
was the major concept that has driven the present work.      
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Figure Captions 
 
Figure 1. A basic process control loop in STAMP (Quyang et al., 2010). 
 
Figure 2: A classification of control flaws (Leveson, 2004)  
 
Figure 3. Fire-induced smoke longitudinal control   
 
Figure 4. Methodology steps of the STAMP-based analysis   
 
Figure 5: The tunnel hierarchical safety control structure 
 
Figure 6: The examined control loop of the fire ventilation process 
 
Figure 7: Risk Matrix 
 
 
